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Abstract. As an immune-inspired algorithm, the Dendritic Cell Algo- 
rithm (DCA), produces promising performance in the  eld of anomaly 
detection. This paper presents the application of the DCA to a standard 
data set, the KDD 99 data set. The results of different implementation 
versions of the DCA, including antigen multiplier and moving time win- 
dows, are reported. The real-valued Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) 
using constant-sized detectors and the C4.5 decision tree algorithm are 
used, to conduct a baseline comparison. The results suggest that the 
DCA is applicable to KDD 99 data set, and the antigen multiplier and 
moving time windows have the same effect on the DCA for this partic- 
ular data set. The real-valued NSA with contant-sized detectors is not 
applicable to the data set. And the C4.5 decision tree algorithm provides 
a benchmark of the classification performance for this data set. 
1 Introduction 
Intrusion detection is the detection of any disallowed activities in a networked 
computer system. Anomaly detection is one of the most popular intrusion detec- 
tion paradigms and this involves discriminating between normal and anoma- 
lous data, based on the knowledge of the normal data. Compared to tradi- 
tional signature-based detection, anomaly detection has a distinct advantage 
over signature-based approaches as they are capable of detecting novel intru- 
sions. However, such systems can be prone to the generation of false alarms. 
The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) is an Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) 
algorithm that is developed for the purpose of anomaly detection. Current re- 
search with this algorithm [6, 4] have suggested that the DCA shows not only 
excellent performance on detection rate, but also promise in assisting in reducing 
the number of false positive errors shown with similar systems. 
To date, the data used for testing the DCA have been generated by the 
authors of the algorithm. While this approach provided the  flexibility to ex- 
plore the functionality of the algorithm, it has left the authors open to the 
criticism that the performance of the DCA has not been assessed when applied 
to a more standard data set. In addition to examining the performance of the 
DCA, such application allows for comparison with more established techniques. 
For this purpose, the KDD Cup 1999 (KDD 99) data set [7] is chosen as the 
benchmark for evaluation, as it is one of the most widely used and understood 
intrusion detection data sets. This data set was originally used in the Interna- 
tional Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition. During the 
competition, competitors applied various machine learning algorithms, such as 
decision tree algorithms [12], neural network algorithms [10] and clustering and 
support vector machine approaches [2]. In addition to these traditional machine 
learning algorithms, a range of AIS algorithms have been applied to this data 
set, such as real-valued Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) [3]. 
The aim of this paper is to assess two hypotheses: Hypothesis 1, the DCA 
can be successfully applied to the KDD 99 data set; Hypothesis 2, changing the 
‘antigen multiplier’ and the size of ‘moving time windows’ have the same effect on 
the DCA. We also include a preliminary comparison between the DCA, the real- 
valued NSA using constant-sized detectors (C-detector) and the C4.5 decision 
tree algorithm to provide a basic benchmark. This paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 provides the description of the algorithm and its implementation; the 
data set and its normalization are described in Section 3; the experimental setup 
is given in Section 4; the result analysis is reported in Section 5; and  finally the 
conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
2 The Dendritic Cell Algorithm 
2.1 The Algorithm 
The DCA is based on the function of dendritic cells (DCs) of the human immune 
system, using the interdisciplinary approach described by Aickelin et al. [1], 
with information on biological DCs described by Greensmith et al. [5]. The 
DCA has the ability to combine multiple signals to assess current context of the 
environment, as well as asynchronously sample another data stream (antigen). 
The correlation between context and antigen is used as the basis of anomaly 
detection in this algorithm. Numerous signal sources are involved as the input 
signals of the system, generally pre-categorized as ‘PAMP’, ‘danger’ and ‘safe’. 
The semantics of these signals are shown as following: 
– PAMP: indicates the presence of definite anomaly. 
– Danger Signal (DS): may or may not indicate the presence of anomaly, 
but the probability of being anomalous is increasing as the value increases. 
– Safe Signal (SS): indicates the presence of absolute normal. 
The DCA processes the input signals associated with the pre-defined weights to 
produce three output signals. The three output signals are costimulation signal 
(Csm), semi-mature signal (Semi) and mature signal (Mat). The pre-defined 
weights used in this paper are those suggested in [5], as shown in Table 1. The 
equation for the calculation of output signals is displayed in Equation 1, 
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 (1) Oj =∑  (Wi j × Si ) j 
i =0 
here Oj are the output signals, Si is the input signals and Wij is the trans- 
forming weight from Si to Oj . 
The DCA introduces individually assigned migration thresholds to determine 
the lifespan of a DC. This may make the algorithm sufficiently robust and flexible 
to detect the antigens found during certain time periods. For example, in real- 
time intrusion detection there are always certain intervals between the time when 
attacks are launched and the time when the system behaves abnormally. The 
use of variable migration thresholds generates DCs whom sample different time 
windows, which may cover the intrusion intervals. 
An individual DC sums the output signals over time, resulting in cumulative 
Csm, cumulative Semi and cumulative Mat. This process keeps going until the 
cell reaches the completion of its lifespan, that is, the cumulative Csm exceeds the 
migration threshold, the DC ceases to sample signals and antigens. At this point, 
the other two cumulative signals are assessed. If the cumulative Semi is greater 
than the cumulative Mat value, the cell differentiates towards semi-mature state 
and is assigned a ‘context value’ of 0, and vice versa - greater cumulative Mat 
results in the differentiation towards mature state and a context value of 1. To 
assess the potential anomalous nature of an antigen, a coefficient is derived from 
the aggregate values across the population, termed the ‘MCAV’ of that antigen. 
This is the proportion of mature context presentations (context value of 1) of 
that particular antigen, relative to the total amount of antigens presented. This 
results in a value between 0 and 1 to which a threshold of anomaly, termed 
‘MCAV threshold’, may be applied. The chosen value for this threshold reflects 
the distribution of normal and anomalous items presented within the original 
data set. Once this value has been applied, antigens with a MCAV which exceeds 
this threshold are classified as anomalous and vice versa. To clarify the algorithm 
a pictorial representation is present in Figure 1. 
2.2 The Implementation 
The general function of the system is to read data instances of the data set and 
then output the MCAV of each type of antigens. In order to implement this 
function, three major components are implemented: 
– Tissue: processes the data source to generate antigens and signals, in each 
iteration Tissue stores the antigens into random indexes of an antigen vector 
and updates current signals to a signal vector. 
 
Fig. 1. The illustration of the DCA processes 
– DCell: manages the DC population and interacts with Tissue to process the 
antigens and signals. 
– TCell: interacts with DCell to produce the final results. 
Two additional functions, antigen multiplier and moving time windows, are 
added into the system for the purpose of optimization. The DCA requires multi- 
ple instances of identical antigens, termed the ‘antigen type’, so processing across 
a population can be performed in order to generate the MCAV for each antigen 
type. The antigen multiplier is implemented to overcome the problem of ‘antigen 
deficiency’, that is, insufficient antigens are supplied to the DC population. As 
one antigen can be generated from each data instance within a data set such 
as KDD 99, the antigen multiplier can make several copies of each individual 
antigen which can be fed to multiple DCs. 
The inspiration of applying moving time windows is from processes seen in 
the human immune system. The signals in the immune system persist over time, 
thus they can influence the environment for a period of time. The persistence of 
the signals can be presented by the cascade of signals within their affective time 
period. Due to missing time stamps in the KDD 99 data set, tailored window 
sizes for each data instance are not applicable, and a  fixed window size is applied. 
The new signals of each iteration are calculated through Equation 2, 
 (2) 
 
input : antigens and pre-categorized signals 
output: antigen types plus MCAV 
initialize DC population; 
while incoming data available do 
update tissue antigen vector and signal vector; 
randomly select DCs from DC population; 
for each selected DC do 
assign a migration threshold; 
while cumulative Csm<=migration threshold do 
get and store antigens; 
get signals; 
calculate interim output signals; 
update cumulative output signals; 
end 
if cumulative Semi<=cumulative Mat then 
cell context=1; 
else 
cell context=0; 
end 
log antigens plus cell context; 
terminate this DC and add a naive DC to the population 
end 
end 
while TCell analysis is not completed do 
for each antigen type do 
calculate MCAV; 
end 
log antigen types with corresponding MCAV; 
end 
 Algorithm 1: Pseudoco de of the implemented DCA. 
where NSij is the new signal value of instance i in category j, w is the window 
size, and OSnj is the original signal value of instance n in category j. 
In brief the DCA combines multiple sources of input data in the form of pre- 
categorized signals and antigens. This input is pro cessed across a population of 
DCs to pro duce the MCAV which is used to assess if an antigen type is normal 
or anomalous. Antigen multiplier and moving time windows are added to the 
algorithm to adapt the KDD 99 data set for use with this algorithm, as well 
as to assess the hypothesis of they having the same e ect on the DCA. The 
pseudoco de of the implemented DCA is shown in Algorithm 1. 
3 The KDD 99 Data Set and Normalization Processes 
3.1 The Data Set 
The KDD 99 data set is derived from the DAPRA 98 Lincoln Lab data set [8] for 
the purpose of applying data mining techniques to the area of intrusion detection. 
The DAPRA 98 data set contains two data sources, which are the network sni er 
data from the sni er placed between a router and the outside gateway and the 
Solaris system audit data from the Solaris audit host. The KDD 99 summarizes 
the two data sources into connections (data instances), each connection has 41 
features (attributes), which can be grouped into four categories [11]: 
– Basic Features: derived from the packet headers without inspecting the 
payload. 
– Content Features: from the assessment of TCP packets by using domain 
knowledge of intrusion detection. 
– Time-based Tra c Features: from the statistical analysis to captures the 
properties with a time window of two seconds. 
– Host-based Tra c Feature: from the statistical analysis of the properties 
over the past 100 connections. 
The KDD 99 is one of the few labeled data sets available in the  eld of 
intrusion detection. The data instances are labeled as normal connections or 
attack types, and the attacks can be grouped into four categories: Denial of 
Service (DOS), Remote to Local (R2L), User to Root (U2R) and Probe. The 
data set used in this paper is the 10% subset of the KDD 99 data set that 
is commonly used by other researchers. It consists of 494021 data instances, 
which are relatively massive. The whole data set would be more computational 
extensive, and hence much more di cult to handle, especially for the real-valued 
NSA with C-detector and the C4.5 decision tree algorithm. Both algorithms 
require training stage, the large the data set is, the longer the training would 
take. The 10% subset is statistically compared with the whole data set, and it 
features the similar ratio of the normal connections and the attacks. 
3.2 Normalization of the Data Set 
As anomaly detection is a two-class classi cation, the labels of each data instance 
in the original data set are replaced by either ‘normal’ for normal connections or 
‘anomalous’ for attacks. Due to the abundance of the attributes, it is necessary 
to reduce the dimensionality of the data set, to discard the irrelevant attributes. 
Therefore, information gains of each attribute are calculated and the attributes 
with low information gains are removed from the data set. The information gain 
of an attribute indicates the statistical relevance of this attribute regarding the 
classi cation [11]. The information gain, termed Gain(S, A) of an attribute A 
relative to a collection of examples S, is de ned as Equation 3 [13], 
where Values(A) is the set of all possible values for attribute A, and Sv is the 
subset of S for which attribute A has value v. The entropy of S relative the 
2-wise classification, termed Entropy(S), is defined as Equation 4 [13], 
 (4) 
where pi is the proportion of S belonging to class i. 
The histograms of the remainder attributes are assessed for the normalization 
of the DCA, to abstract the knowledge of both normal and anomalous. Based 
on the characteristics of the input signals, ten numeric attributes are grouped 
into the categories as follows: 
– PAMP: serror rate, srv serror rate, same srv rate, dst host serror and dst 
host rerror rate. 
– DS: count and srv count. 
– SS: logged in, srv different host rate and dst host count. 
Let x be the value of an attribute, if it is certain that anomalies appear when 
x   [m, n], this attribute can either be PAMP or DS; otherwise if normality 
arises in this range, this attribute can be SS. The value of this attribute is then 
normalized into the range from 0 to 100 through linear normalization defined by 
Equation 5, 
 (5) 
where f(x) is the normalization function. The average of the multiple attribute 
values in each signal category is the value of that category. In addition, the other 
data steam of the DCA, the antigens, are created by combining three nominal 
attributes, which are protocol, service and  flag. Multiple instances of each antigen 
type can generated through this way, which satisfies the requirement of the DCA 
for multiple observations of each antigen type. It makes sense in the case of both 
human immune system and intrusion detection: since antigens with the same 
pathogenic patterns can invade the human immune system over and over again; 
and attacks with the same patterns can be launched discretely over time in a 
networked computer system. 
The ten attributes selected for the signals in the DCA are chosen to represent 
the detectors and antigens in the NSA. These attributes are normalized into 
the range from 0 to 1, using max-min normalization, thus the data space is 
a unitary hypercube [0, 1]1 0 . The data set is then rearranged to generate ten 
subsets through 10-folder cross-validation. The training data is made of the nine 
folders and the testing data is made of the one folder in each subset. The self set 
of the NSA is derived from all the normal data instances in the training data, 
and the antigens are the data instances in the testing data. The input data of 
the C4.5 decision tree algorithm contains the same attributes as those of the 
NSA but without normalization, and the labels of normal and anomalous are 
provided for the purpose of training. 
4 Experimental Setup 
Both the DCA and the NSA are implemented in C++ with the g++ 4.2 com- 
plier, and the C4.5 decision tree algorithm is performed in Weka [14], which is 
a collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks. The experi- 
ments are run on a PC on which Ubuntu Linux 7.10 with a kernel version of 
2.6.22-14-generic is installed. The receiver operating characteristics (ROC) anal- 
ysis is performed to evaluate the classi cation performance of the DCA and the 
NSA. The true positive (TP) rate, false positive (FP) rate, true negative (TN) 
rate and false negative (FN) rate of each experiment are calculated, and the rel- 
evant ROC graphs are plotted as well. Three sets of experiments are performed: 
various DCA versions (E1), the real-valued NSA using C-detector (E2), and the 
C4.5 decision tree algorithm (E3). 
In all experiments related to the DCA, the size of the DC population is 
set as 100 and it is constant as the system runs. The migration threshold of 
an individual DC is a random value between 100 and 300, to ensure this DC 
to survive over multiple iterations. The ‘perfect MCAV’ of an antigen type is 
calculated based on the labels of the original data set, normal is equivalent to 
context value 0 and anomalous is equivalent to context value 1. To generate the 
classi cation results of the DCA and the ‘perfect classification results’ from the 
perfect MCAVs, a MCAV threshold of 0.8 is applied. The MCAV threshold is 
derived from the proportion of anomalous data instances of the whole data set , 
which is equal to 80%. The classification results of the DCA are then compared 
with the perfect classification results, to assess the TP, FP, TN and FN. Three 
experiments of E1 are performed corresponding to the DCA versions as following: 
– E1.1: the basic version of the DCA. 
– E1.2: the system with antigen multiplier, the antigens are multiplied by 5, 
10, 50 and 100. 
– E1.3: the system with moving time windows, the window size is respectively 
equal to 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 100 and 1000. 
For each single experiment, ten runs are performed and the final result is the 
average of the ten runs. In order to make the results from different experiments 
more comparable, a  xed sequence of random seeds for ten runs is used. For E1.2 
and E1.3, the two-sided Mann-Whitney test is performed to assess if various 
parameters can make the results statistically different from each other. The 
statistical significance a is set as 0.05, thus giving a confidence of 95% to either 
accept or reject the null hypothesis. 
E2 includes a range of experiments of the NSA, as the data space increases 
from two dimensional to ten dimensional. According to the parameters men- 
tioned in [9], the self radius is equal to 0.1 and the detector amount is increased 
to 1000 because of the large size of the data, and the matching rule used is the 
Euclidean distance matching. The results produced by the algorithm are com- 
pared to the labeled testing data, namely the ‘perfect result’, to perform the 
ROC analysis. The final results of each dimension is the average of ten subsets. 
The experiment setup of C4.5 decision tree algorithm are as follows: the clas- 
sifier chosen in Weka is J48, which is a class for generating an unpruned or a 
pruned C4.5 decision tree; the test option of the classification is set as 10-folder 
cross-validation. 
5 Result Analysis 
The results of E1 are shown in Table 2, which indicate the antigen multiplier 
cannot consequentially enhance the system performance. The signals associated 
with the misclassified antigens are generated incorrectly from the original data 
set, thus the DCs always assign wrong context values no matter whether the 
antigens are multiplied or not. Moreover, the moving time windows cannot sig- 
nificantly improve the system performance either. Due to the limitation of the 
 
Fig. 2. Results of the real-valued NSA with C-detector across different dimensionality 
data set, the tailored window sizes of each data instance that may result in 
better system performance are not applicable. Furthermore, the Mann-Whitney 
test suggests a 95% confidence to accept the null hypothesis, that is, the results 
of all the experiments in E1 are not statistical different from each other. 
The results of E2 are shown in Table 3, and the ROC results E2 from two 
dimensional to ten dimensional are shown in Figure 2. The algorithm produces 
acceptable results when the data space is two dimensional. But as the dimen- 
sionality increases, the classification performance is getting worse and worse. 
The algorithm cannot detect any anomalies when the data space is six di- 
mensional or more. As the dimensionality of the data space increases, the search 
space grows exponentially, thus it is becoming more and more difficult to gener- 
ate sufficient detectors that can effectively cover the space of non-self. 
The ROC graph of the results in E1 and E2 when the dimensionality is ten 
is shown in Figure 3. The results of the DCA are located on the top-left corner 
of the graph, showing that all versions the DCA can successfully detect around 
75% true anomalies over all actual anomalies as well as produce no or few false 
alarms. The real-valued NSA with C-detector cannot produce any useful results, 
as it fails to detect any anomalies. Moreover, as expected the C4.5 decision tree 
algorithm produces superb results, the true positive rate is 0.988 and the false 
positive rate is 0.008. This algorithm is designed specifically for the purpose of 
data mining, its classification performance is supposed to be better than the 
other two algorithms that are designed for the purpose of anomaly detection. 
But in terms of false positive rate, the classification performances of the DCA 
and the C4.5 decision tree algorithm are comparable with each other. 
 
Fig. 3. The ROC graph of E1, E2 and E3 as data space is ten dimensional 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper presents the algorithm behaviors of the DCA, when it is applied to 
a standard data set, the KDD 99 data set. The results show that the DCA is 
able to work with the data set and produce reasonable performance, therefore 
Hypothesis 1 is accepted. Moreover, the DCA is an unsupervised learning al- 
gorithm, it does not require training with normal data instances. It acquires 
the knowledge of normal and anomalous through the categorization of signals 
based on basic statistical analysis. Besides, it is not constrained by high dimen- 
sionality of the data sets. Thus the DCA is applicable to large data sets with 
high dimensionality. The real-valued NSA with C-detector has poor classification 
performance on the high dimensional KDD 99 data set, it could not manage to 
detect any anomalies as the dimensionality increases up to six or more. There- 
fore, this algorithm is not applicable to the data sets with hight dimensionality. 
As a specialized machine learning algorithm, the C4.5 decision tree algorithm 
produces excellent results, it provides a benchmark showing the ideal results of 
the KDD 99 data set. 
Due to limitations of the data set, the DCA could not be optimized by either 
antigen multiplier or moving time windows. First of all, it is only possible to 
generate one unique antigen from each data instance, leading to the insufficient 
observations of each antigen type by relative DCs, the problem cannot be solved 
with the antigen multiplier. Furthermore, the time stamps of each connection are 
unavailable, thus it is impossible to apply tailored window sizes in the system, 
and hence the advantage of the moving time windows is not fully utilized. Even 
 
though, both antigen multiplier and moving time windows have the same e ect 
on the DCA for this particular data set, and hence Hypothesis 2 is accepted. 
Some future directions of DCA research can be:  rst of all, to perform more 
rigorous comparisons between the DCA and other AIS algorithms; Secondly, to 
apply the DCA to other data sets, to further explore the limits of the DCA and 
to understand the antigen multiplier and moving time windows; Thirdly, to add 
more features to the DCA, to make the algorithm more adaptive and flexible. 
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